Published: 02 August 2007

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Flashpoints

Central (including Kabul)
District 11, Kabul City (Kabul); Jalalabad Road, District 9, Kabul City (Kabul); District 5, Kabul City (Kabul); Khawaja Musafir area, Paghman District (Kabul); Arghandi Suflay area, Paghman District (Kabul); Uzbin Valley, Surobi District (Kabul); Andar District (Ghazni); Lawani Bazaar, Qarabagh District (Ghazni); Ibrahimzai, Dih Yak District (Ghazni); Krunch, Mehtarlam District (Laghman); Qarghayi District (Laghman); Alishing District (Laghman); Sulemankhel/Dabar, Charkh District (Laghman); Pul-e-Alam and Mohammad Agha Districts (Logar); Nirkh District (Wardak); Bamba, Chak District (Wardak)

South and East
Nahri Sarraj District (Helmand); Gereshk District (Helmand); Kajaki District (Helmand); Bolan area, Lashkargah District (Helmand); Shorandam area, Daman District (Kandahar); Zhari District (Kandahar); Panjwayi District (Kandahar); Khakrez District (Kandahar); District 9, Kandahar City (Kandahar); Maiwand District (Kandahar); District 10, Kandahar City (Kandahar); Dand District (Kandahar); District 5, Kandahar City (Kandahar); Borgai area, Shamul District (Khost); Matun District (Khost); Khazany Kandy area, Pachir Wa Agam District (Nangarhar); Surkh Rod District (Nangarhar); Khashrod District (Nimroz); Kamdesh District (Nuristan); Bar Kunar District (Kunar); Sirkanay District (Kunar); Pech District (Kunar); Chawkay District (Kunar); Narang District (Kunar); Dewa Gul, Chawkay District (Kunar); Waza Khwa District (Paktika); Ziruk District (Paktika); Sar Hawza District (Paktika); Dila District (Paktika); Urgun District (Paktika); Shwak District (Paktya); Waza Zadran District (Paktya); Zurmat District (Paktya); Chamkani District (Paktya); Gardez District (Paktya); Tirin Kot (Uruzgan); Keshay area, Tirin Kot District (Uruzgan); Charchino area (Uruzgan); Shajoy District (Zabul); Qalat District (Zabul)

North
Dasht Qurogh area, Faizabad District (Badakhshan); Faizabad City (Badakhshan); Pul-e-Hisar/Andarab District (Baghlan); Nahrin District (Baghlan); Boheen Village, Khan Abad District (Kunduz); Kunduz City (Kunduz)

West
Ghormach District (Badghis); Qadis District (Badghis); Bala Buluk District (Farah); Deh Tut area (Farah); Bakwa District (Farah); Chagcharan District (Ghor); Salma Dam area, Chisti Sharif District (Herat); Pashtun Zarghun District (Herat)

The Flashpoint section is not a comprehensive list of all attacks in the previous reporting period but should be used by personnel to give an indication of the spread of attacks.

Areas of continued concern

All of Wardak Province should be considered extremely hostile (on a par with Ghazni, if indeed it is not now worse), especially in the wake of the abduction of German nationals. Additionally, the Behsud District of Wardak has seen some significant clashes between Hazaras and Kuchi nomads (with the former claiming that the latter are supportive of the Taliban); however, all Hazara areas in the centre of the country should be considered liable to such disturbances.

The southern zone, particularly Helmand, Kandahar (with the Zhari, Panjwayi and Maiwand Districts currently the most dangerous), Uruzgan and Day Kundi Provinces should both be considered extremely hazardous. Road travel in these areas – but especially in Helmand and Kandahar – is extremely dangerous. Zabul should be considered very susceptible to hostility.

The eastern belt of Paktika, Khost, Paktya, Nangarhar, Nuristan (especially the Kamdesh District) and Kunar Provinces (particularly the Korengal Valley north of Asadabad and Pech District in general) is of habitual concern. Khost, Kunar and Paktika have witnessed ongoing hostility; these areas are considered by some to be as dangerous, if not more so, than the above-mentioned southern areas. Kunar sees regular improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and attacks on security force positions. Nangarhar should be considered volatile for a number of reasons. There has been a dramatic increase in hostilities in Paktya and Paktika Provinces recently.

Districts through which arterial roads run in the central provinces of Logar and Ghazni are especially likely to suffer security-related incidents. This is very much the case in Ghazni, with the Andar District being a particular problem.

The western provinces of Herat, Badghis, Ghor and Farah seem to suffer particularly from banditry. Recent attacks and anti-militant operations in Farah indicate that Taliban or other militants have increased their activity in this province. Badghis is also reported to suffer from the presence of hostile Pashtun forces.

District offices and organisations associated with the police and the local power structure, such as governors’ offices, local police forces, and in particular, Afghan National Army (ANA) troops, and Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel – with their outposts and convoys – are especially likely to be targeted for attack.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF – composed of NATO troops and troops from countries not in NATO) United Nations and NGO (non-governmental organisation) facilities. NGOs that work closely with provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) should be aware that they might be specifically targeted for having a military appearance.

Especially in regard to associating with ISAF or CF (Coalition Forces), base attacks are a concern in the south (especially Helmand and Kandahar) and in the east (Kunar). Personnel staying in military bases in the southern, central and eastern regions should be aware of the propensity for standoff attacks. Rockets, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) are especially popular insurgent forms of attack, and may occur without warning. The smaller and more remote bases are most at risk, although large installations (such as Kandahar Airfield) are also susceptible.

Many of the more remote areas of the country are still at considerable risk from landmines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from previous conflicts.

Projections

NATO has made some rather optimistic, and frankly unrealistic, claims that they will reduce casualty numbers by arming their aircraft with “smaller bombs”. This will in no way change the likelihood of civilian collateral damage during airstrikes – the main problem is differentiating between civilians and insurgents/militants: this distinction is best drawn by having soldiers on the ground fighting the battles in close-quarters. However, Western aversion to casualties precludes this approach, and so the West is likely to continue to put inflated amounts of faith in high-tech solutions. One announcement that came hot on the heels of the “smaller bombs” announcement was that shortly the US will deploy four MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – about which there is huge excitement as these can carry 14 Hellfire missiles to the Predator’s two, or even be kitted with two 500 lb bombs. Once again, this shows that casualty reduction strategies are based on increasing the sophistication of the technology, whereas low-tech solutions are ultimately what is required. The announcement of the deployment of the Reaper UAVs at a stroke contradicts any announcements about reducing firepower to help prevent civilian casualties; not only is the Reaper a step up in firepower, it is also unmanned – creating an even greater disconnect between potential targets and those assigned to assess their threat and then attack them if necessary. Civilian casualties are likely to persist as one of the main factors turning local opinion against the CF.

Mansour Dadullah, brother of the slain militant leader Mullah Dadullah, has announced that the Taliban are under instruction to kidnap “as many foreigners as possible”; he also said that the Taliban were planning to use children to behead hostages. This could well be a reaction to earlier reports that he was always considered to be more moderate than his brother, and he is now trying to recast himself in a more extreme light. It is unlikely that his comments about children will win him support – even the fact that female expatriates are being held hostage is a dent to insurgent credibility at grass roots levels. However, his threats, combined with the recent precedent for abduction, indicate that there are likely to be yet further attempts (some possibly successful) to kidnap expatriate staff.

It was reported that a C-130 transport aircraft narrowly avoided being shot down by a guided, shoulder-fired missile as it flew over Nimroz Province on 22 July. The event has not been confirmed by military sources, but a Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) alert was issued for military and civil aircraft flying over the south west of the country. This alert was still live as at 29 July. It is likely that further attacks against aircraft will occur – although the vast majority of these are likely to involve unguided projectiles such as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Attacks are still most likely to occur against helicopters, especially those flying in mountainous terrain: Kunar and Nuristan are especially likely candidates in this regard.

On 26 July, the Kacha Garhi refugee camp in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) was officially closed, resulting in a wave of 37,000 (registered) refugees heading back towards Afghanistan. This is likely to generate security concerns – not only as the returnees clash with other residents over resources, but also potentially because the inhabitants of this camp (and others) have become a haven for Taliban fighters. These claims are likely partially true – it will be the families of Taliban fighters who will reside in the camps, and hence dispelling these families will not only anger the heads of the families, but as they settle in new areas they will likely “talibanise” them too. With an NWFP minister having already stated that all Afghan refugees are to have been repatriated by 2009, the problems associated with returnees are likely to increase in number and magnitude.

It is unlikely that the Korean hostage scenario is going to end with no more bloodshed. Already two (male) hostages have been killed; but yet there is huge pressure on President Karzai not to give into the demands for the release of Taliban prisoners in exchange. The Taliban have repeated their threats to kill further hostages; and given the unlikely climb-down by the authorities, it is likely they will kill more. The four remaining male hostages are most at risk, and if the government continues to stand firm, it is unfortunately highly likely that all four will be killed.

Specific warnings relating to the current reporting period continue to be received. On 29 July it was warned that a threat had been received of an IED attack that could be perpetrated in the area of Kabul University. On 31 July, it was warned that suspect two VBIEDs could be operating in the city – the vehicles described were a blue and red Toyota Corollas, with the numberplates 12828 and 17713 respectively. A general warning was also issued in the last reporting period describing the threat of ambush near Satani Ghazna Castle (on the Wardak-Ghazni stretch of the Kabul-Ghazni road), where woodland offers good cover for an attack. An insurgent presence was reported on 26 July in the Tamazan Valley of Day Kundi’s Nili District, although they are thought to be most active in the Gizab area – attacks in this area should therefore be considered more likely. On 27 July, it was warned that a group of insurgents disguised as police were to attempt an infiltration of Mehtarlam City; the following day saw a warning of an insurgent presence in the Bad Pash area of Laghman’s Qarghayi District, which will likely result in roadside attacks along the Kabul-Jalalabad road. On 27 July, it was warned that a group was planning to perform roadside IED attacks in Kandahar’s Maruf District. It was suggested on 28 July that attacks might soon occur against police checkpoints on the Khost-Gardez road in Khost; a similar warning came the next day, when it was suggested that a group of 25-30 was planning similar attacks in the Shahr-e-Naw area of Khost’s Chamkani District. On 28 July, a small group of insurgents was spotted in the Karam Khel area of Nangarhar’s Khogyani District, although the next day saw a wider warning of attacks in Khogyani, Sherzad, Pachir Wa Agam and Hisarak Districts. On 31 July, further specific warnings of groups infiltrating the Hisarak, Lal Pur, Goshta Districts and the Tora Bora area of Khogyani District were issued. On 30 July, reports were received detailing the threat of insurgent groups along the Zaranj-Delaram highway in Nimroz. A 27 July warning was issued which spoke of the threat of attack against ANP checkpoints in the Shigal area of Kunar’s Bar Kunar Province; however, by 28 and 29 July it was warned that attacks against checkpoints were to be expected in the Pech, Watapur, Narang and Chapa Dara Districts. On 31 July it was warned that insurgents were planning to plant IEDs on the road leading to the Nawa pass in the Sirkanay District (Kunar). Warnings of insurgent infiltrations in Paktya were received on 27, 29 and 31 July, with the areas at risk surmised as the Chamkani, Jaji and Zurmat Districts. On 30 July, a parliamentarian warned that the Charchino, Gizab and Chora areas/districts of Uruzgan were openly hosting “rebel training centres” – this suggests not only a threat in that immediate area, but that the general threat of attack in the south (where the trainees are likely to be deployed) will persist (if not increase) in the coming months.

Summary

Afghanistan this week has not seen any especially positive developments, and although abductions have dominated recent reporting, the remaining security threats remain essentially unchanged. The two abduction cases involving foreigners are still unresolved – a German remains detained in Wardak with four Afghan colleagues, while 21 Korean hostages remain in captivity, having seen another of their number executed. Excluding the abductions, the most serious incident this week was a suicide bomb in Kabul, which had been relatively quiet for a few weeks after having witnessed a sudden escalation in the number of attacks. Further warnings and the precedent for such attacks to occur in waves might well indicate further attacks in the capital in the short term.

Meanwhile, the south and east continue to be very hostile. Nuristan and Nimroz have seen increases in activity (this is significant – these two outlying provinces had been largely left alone by CF until this year, but as the CF have increased their presence, so they have generated resistance); Kandahar and Helmand continue to be subject to insurgency on a widespread scale. Paktya and Paktika have both maintained consistent levels of hostility compared to previous weeks, although interestingly Nangarhar and Khost Provinces have perhaps witnessed fewer actual security lapses over the last reporting period – although the discovery of numerous IEDs indicates a continuing hostile presence in these two provinces.

AKE’s Afghanistan Security Briefing is an all-source intelligence product compiled with information from an array of open and privileged sources, and essential contribution from AKE Security Risk Specialists. AKE would like to thank the Afghanistan NGO Security Office (ANSO) in particular for the provision of incident report information.

This is an abridged version of AKE's Afghanistan Security Briefing. The full version is sent out on Tuesdays and Thursdays and is available to subscribers. For a free 14-day trial please contact intel@akegroup.com

For more in-depth analysis of the security situation in Afghanistan as well as other world hot spots see Global Intake, AKE’s online strategic information and intelligence tool.

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